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STRIPPING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ 
RIGHTS FOR THE SAKE OF 
WISCONSIN BUDGET REPAIR:  
REALITY OR RHETORIC?
Harold datz*
We are condemned to live in interesting times, I suppose. I’d like to take a 
few moments to give some general concepts about labor law and the public 
sector, including exploring the intersection of unions and collective bargaining 
in the public sector.  This intersection has constituent parts, and I’d like to talk 
about each of them briefly.
First of all, in terms of breaking it down, I suppose we start with the 
fundamental notion of whether one has a right to be a member of a union at all. 
I think that there is at least some law and it certainly reflects my own view. 
 
1
*  B.A., LL.B., University of Florida. Mr. Datz joined the NLRB legal staff in 
Washington, D.C. in 1965 as part of the Regional Advice Branch. Two years later he 
was transferred to the Pittsburgh, PA Regional Office (Region 6) as a Trial Attorney. He 
returned to the Advice Branch as a Supervisory Attorney in 1970. In 1971, Mr. Datz was 
appointed Deputy Assistant General Counsel in the Division of Operations Management, 
with supervisory responsibility for seven regional offices. In 1972, he was promoted to 
Deputy Associate General Counsel in the Division of Advice and from 1976-1990 served as 
head of the Division, which provides legal advice on behalf of Regional Directors in cases 
involving novel and complex issues and matters of national importance. Subsequently, 
Mr. Datz served as Chief Counsel to Members John N. Raudabaugh (1990±1994), Charles 
I. Cohen (1994-1996), John Higgins (1996-1997), and Peter J. Hurtgen (1997-2002). 
Mr. Hurtgen was Chairman from 2001 to 2002. In 2002, he was appointed by Chairman 
Robert J. Battista to serve as his Chief Counsel. Mr. Datz retired from the NLRB in 2007, 
after serving for forty-two years. Mr. Datz is an adjunct professor at Georgetown, George 
Washington, and American University Law Schools. He is co-editor of tHe developing 
labor law and tHe board, tHe Courts, and tHe national labor relations 
aCt (John Harper & Harold Datz eds., 2d ed. 1983), has contributed to international 
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Freedom of association, as guaranteed by the federal constitution2 and by 
the state constitutions as well,3 protects individuals from criminal prosecution 
on the basis of union membership.4 
Of course, we know in the private sector, ordinarily one would not have 
any right to a state lawsuit on this,5 but under the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA)—the Magna Carta of labor law in the United States—there is a 
section seven right to be a member of a union.6
But in the public sector, we are dealing with state, rather than federal action. 
and, at least at that base level, there is a right to be a member of a union. 
but it does not necessarily follow that there is a constitutional right to engage 
in collective bargaining, i.e. have your union be the exclusive bargaining 
representative, or have your state employer constitutionally obligated 
to bargain with you.7 Of course, there is a constitutional right to petition 
the government for redress of grievances.8 and, at one level, one could not 
criminalize employees who come together and seek collective bargaining with 
their employer.9
In terms of whether the government has a constitutional obligation to bargain 
collectively with the union, one should note an older case: Smith v. Arkansas, 
which seems to suggest that there is no constitutional obligation or duty on 
the part of the government to bargain with the union.10 Of course, we do have 
labor & employment laws (1st ed. 1997), and is a contributing editor to labor union 
law  and regulation (William W. Osborne et al. eds., 2003). He is a member of the 
Governing Council of the ABA Section of Labor and employment Law, Professor Datz 
is a frequent speaker and lecturer before bar associations and labor law seminars. He is 
also past president of the National College of Labor & employment Lawyers. He is the 
recipient of the ABA Federal Labor and employment Lawyer award. He is a recipient of a 
Presidential Merit Award
1. Directors in cases involving novel and complex issues and matters of national 
importance. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations”).
2.  u.s. Const. amend. I.
3.  See, e.g., K.y. Const. § 1; va Const. art. 1, § 12; n.H. Const. art. 12, § 1; w.v. 
Const. art. 3, § 16.
4.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
5.  See Branch v. City of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.e.2d 289, 293 (S.C. 2000) (excluding 
public sector employers from the meaning of “employer” for the purpose of a right to work 
statute, and basing the decision on traditional differences between the rights of public and 
private sector workers to collectively bargain). 
6.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (“[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, [and] to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations”).
7.  See, e.g., tex. gov’t Code ann. § 617.002 (West 2012) (“[A]n official of the 
state or of a political subdivision of the state may not enter into a collective bargaining 
contract with a labor organization regarding wages, hours, or conditions of employment of 
public employees.”). 
8.  u.s. Const  amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the . . . right 
of the people  . . .  to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
9.  See Pickering v. Bd. of educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (holding that retaliation 
against employees who wrote a critical letter together is a violation of the First Amendment 
right to free speech).
10.  See Smith v. Ark. State Highway emp., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979) 
(warning that although public employees who associate for collective bargaining purposes 
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statutory rights that guarantee and give the obligation to the state employer: 
eighty percent of the states have statutes that authorize collective bargaining 
to some extent—with the majority of the states having a statutory obligation 
or some other obligation short of the constitutional obligation to bargain with 
the union.11 Therefore, even though an entity could not criminalize efforts on 
the part of employees to ban collectively and seek collective bargaining, in 
a constitutional sense, there probably is no obligation on the part of the state 
employer to bargain back.
and then, of course, the next component is the right to make and enforce 
the collective bargaining contract. yet, sometimes collective bargaining does 
not result in a contract, resulting in industrial strife. In the private sector, that 
strife can take the form of weapons, strikes and lockouts—and God forbid 
in football—that can occur.12 But again, speaking constitutionally, there is no 
constitutional right on the part of public employees to engage in the strike.13
Whether there is a statutory right or a common law right to engage in a 
strike is a more difficult question. In most of the states, and in most instances, 
there exists a ban on strikes by public-sector workers.14 One can argue, that 
there should be sanctions for police officers and firefighters who strike, or that 
these individuals should be denied the right to strike.15 But on the other hand, 
would a strike of individuals in a state licensing office, cause the world to 
come to an end? 
Of course, even if there was a right to strike, would a government employer 
have the right to replace as exists in the private sector? The right to replace on 
the part of the employer in the private sector is undermined to a certain extent 
by the right to strike.16 So the private employer cannot discharge the striking 
are constitutionally protected, “the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative 
obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the 
association and bargain with it.”)
11. See State Bargaining Rules Interactive Map, nat’l Coun. on teaCHer Quality, 
http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope/#interactiveMap (last visited Sep. 4, 2012) (comparing 
collective bargaining legislation in each state).
12.  See genrally Alexander M. Bard, Note, Strength in Numbers: The Question of 
Decertification of Sports Unions in 2011 and the Benefit of Administrative Oversight, 1 
Am. U. Lab. & emp. L.F. 347 (2011) (examining the causes and ramifications of NFL 
lockouts).
13. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) (holding that “[n]either the 
common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike.”; United 
States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 274 (1947) (discussing the rationale 
for legislation granting private workers to strike, and finding that “[th]ese considerations, 
on their face, obviously do not apply to the Government as an employer or to relations 
between the Government and its employees.)”
14. See Right to Strike State Bargaining Rules Interactive Map, supra note 11.
15. See Bd. of ed. of Martins Ferry City Sch. Dist. v. Ohio ed. Ass’n, 235 N.e.2d 
538, 543 (Com. Pl. 1967) (considering the opinions of several past presidents regarding 
strikes by public workers, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who wrote, 
“Since their own services have to do with the functioning [sic] of the government, a 
strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent 
or obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, 
looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it is 
unthinkable and intolerable.”
16. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (affirming 
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worker, but it can permanently replace the employee.17 Could you, or would 
you take that body of law and transpose it to the public sector?18 In lieu of 
the right to strike, there are other avenues to resolve a collective bargaining 
impact, including mediation, fact-finding arbitration, and perhaps other ways, 
to resolve the matter.19 At least for some, these peaceful ways of resolving a 
collective argument conflict that exists in the public sector may be an adequate 
substitute for the right to engage in the use of weaponry.20 
Another component of what we mean by labor unions and collective 
bargaining is the whole matter of union security as well. Union security, in 
the private sector means that except for the so-called right-to-work states, 
employees can be required to join the union or at least pay dues as a condition 
of employment—the idea being that if a union has the obligation to represent 
fairly everybody in the unit, then everybody should pay their fair share, 
preventing free-riders.21 And so, everyone represented by a unit, even if an 
employee had voted against representation in a union, is represented.22 Thus, 
under the union security concept, all members of the union ought to pay for the 
cost that the union undergoes in representing employees.
So in the private sector, except in right-to-work states, you do have union 
security that can exist in a collective bargaining contract.23 It takes the consent 
of the employer, but you can obligate employees to pay dues. Now transposing 
that to the public sector, there are some who are offended by the notion that 
one must pay dues to a union in order to get a public job, in order to serve 
the government.24 But again, the counter-argument is that if the union is the 
exclusive representative, the union ought to be recompensed for the services 
that it performs.25
It is a bit of a debate in the public sector as to whether it is a good idea or a 
bad idea to compel employees to support the union financially as a condition 
the right of private employers to permanently replace striking workers).
17. Id.
18. See generally Rona Pietrak, Some Reflections on Mackay’s Application to Legal 
Economic Strikes in the Public Sector: An Analysis of State Collective Bargaining Statutes, 
68 or. l. rev. 87 (1989) (considering whether the Mackay doctrine should apply in the 
public sector).
19. See IAMAW v. General elec. Co., 406 F.2d 1046 (1969) (identifying the national 
policy of encouraging arbitration of labor disputes).
20. See Neil Fox, Patco and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law As Ideology, 
1985 u. ill. l. rev. 245, 262-63 (1985) (“Numerous statutes provide for binding interest 
arbitration for certain classes of employees as a substitute for strikes, while a few states that 
have followed the private sector model very closely allow public employees to strike.”).
21. See Radio Officers’ Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union, A.F.L. v. N.L.R.B., 
347 U.S. 17 (1954) (recognizing the “free-rider” issue as legitimate concern).
22. See N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (discussing the 
agency shop union model). .
23. See id. (finding union security clauses to be lawful).
24. See Seidemann v. Bowen, 499 F. 3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2007) (claiming that agency 
procedures are inconsistent with the First Amendment and the duty of fair representation)...
25. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 553 (1991) (noting that 
mandatory dues compensate the union for benefits that nonmembers necessary accrue).
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of public employment.26 even if an employee is required to pay dues, the 
employee can always get back, so to speak, that portion of his dues that may 
go for non-representation or political purposes.27
Related to that is the check-off, which is a means of paying one’s union 
dues.28 Again, in the private sector, if the employer agrees to deduct union dues 
from payroll, then those dues will be deducted and paid over to the union.29 
Again, the check-off takes the consent of the governmental employer—yet, 
now several states seem to want to do away with check-off.30 
26. See Abood v. Detroit Brd. of educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
27. See, e.g., Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009); Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 507; ellis v. 
BRAC, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
28. See N.L.R.B. v. W. Kentucky Coal Co., 116 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1940) (Allen, 
J., concurring) (observing that nothing before or in the NLRA suggests that check off 
arrangements are illegal); Wirtz v. Local 191, Teamsters, 226 F. Supp. 179 (D. Conn. 1964) 
(discussing the check-off).
29. See Commc’n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (holding that under the 
NLRA, employees may lawfully be required to pay periodic union dues and certain fees as 
a condition of employment regardless of their union membership so long as those dues and 
fees are related to collective bargaining activities).
30. See City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int’l. Ass’n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 
(1976) (holding that a public employer’s refusal to withhold union dues is lawful).
